Post-Crisis Neoliberal Resilience in Europe

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Introduction

- Motivation:
 - after severe and ongoing economic crisis since 2007/2008 and short Keynesian intermezzo, EU seemingly returned to neoliberal policy → resilient neoliberalism?
- Problematic:
 - Is there persistence of the neoliberal policy regime that would justify the term resilience?
 - What explains the resilience of this policy regime?
- Strategy:
 - Show persistence, but also changes, in policy regime
 - Exploit different theoretical approaches to explain resilience

Overview

- **1.** Introduction
- 2. Evidence of neoliberal resilience in Commission's discursive agenda
- 3. Neoliberal hegemony and retrenchment of democracy: political economy perspective
- 4. Neoliberal policy making: macroeconomic perspective
- 5. Conclusion
- 6. Shortcomings and further research

1. Introduction

• Definition neoliberalism:

"political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites" (Harvey 2007)

- Time horizon: outbreak of 2007/2008 global economic crisis until today
- Focus on European level
- Surprising crisis, surprising resilience? The end of neoliberalism...?
- Blind spots of mainstream (Ryner 2012)
 - Stability, convergence or divergence?

2. Evidence of neoliberal resilience

- Analysis of Commission Work Programme from 2007 to 2017
 - Priorities for each upcoming year
- Discursive analysis: ideological sphere of Commission's selfrepresentation
- Caveat: Gap between communication and action
- Focus on the fields of
 - Economic and fiscal governance \rightarrow deepened neoliberal regime
 - Financial regulation and taxation \rightarrow mixed
 - Growth, employment and social policy \rightarrow deepened neoliberal regime

3. Neoliberal hegemony and retrenchment of democracy: political economy perspective

- Neo-Gramscian approach: hegemony and organic crisis
 - European crisis: Shift from more consent-based to more coercive policy (Keucheyan & Durand 2015, Bruff 2014)
- More executive decision making
- More rule-based decision making
- → Authoritarian, technocratic and undemocratic

→ Retrenchment of democracy and reinforced Ordoliberalism (Biebricher 2013)

3. Neoliberal hegemony and retrenchment of democracy: political economy perspective

- Shift to more Ordoliberalism incomplete and contradictory
 - Market insulated from popular forces, but not from powerful market actors
 - Executive crisis interventions partially in line with, partially also contradicting blueprint Ordoliberalism
- Reasons for resilience
 - Executive policy: Dominant classes extended hegemonic power during crisis
 - Rule-based policy: lock-in in neoliberal regime
 - Democratic process increasingly powerless
- Contradictions and prospects for change
 - Executive policy: back door for change?
 - Simultaneous strengthening and weakening of the state: target of social struggle (Bruff 2014)

4. Neoliberal policy making: a macro perspective

- Post-Keynesian, French Regulationist and Varieties of Capitalism approach
- Flawed financial architecture → imbalances → crisis and resilience
 - ECB: Pure focus on price stability; no Lender of Last Resort of countries
 - Restricted fiscal policy: Fiscal discipline believed to prevent crises
 - Designed to fight inflation and budget deficits, not crises (Stockhammer 2016)
 - Financial liberalisation and economic integration without social integration
- Neoliberal: presupposes that efficient markets disciplining governments and low inflation are sufficient to create stable economy and convergence;
 - private sector not considered as source of instability
- Two unsustainable growth models: export-led and debt-led growth
 - Financial liberalisation and financialisation: falling wage share
 - Debt- and export-led growth replace domestic demand: build-up of imbalances and divergence of North and South

4. Neoliberal policy making: a macro perspective

Financial crisis 2007/08

Inadequate policy response restrained by financial architecture

- Allowed financial crisis to translate into severe sovereign debt crisis (Stockhammer 2016)
- Belief that crisis caused was by excessive government spending: Help for crisis countries linked to austerity
- Further drop in demand, worsening economic situation

4. Neoliberal policy making: a macro perspective

Reasons of resilience and prospects for change

- Misinterpretation of the crisis (Hein 2012) ?
- Powerful interests: austerity means further redistribution from wages to profits; capitalist class ensure their dominance (Lapavitsas et al. 2010, Radice 2014)
- Weakness and fragmentation of the European left; third way
- De-synchronised experience of labour across Europe (Stockhammer et al 2016)
- Paradoxical situation: dominance of finance and institutional bias

 \rightarrow exclusion of labour;

 \rightarrow fragile finan. architecture, uneven income distribution and weak recovery

- → Reversal of redistribution tendency necessary for adequate demand and growth
- \rightarrow Re-regulation and re-embedding of markets

5. Conclusion

- Deepened neoliberal policy regime as observed in Commission agenda
- Crisis of European historical block led to shift from consent to coercion
- More executive and rule-based policy: contradictory and incomplete Ordoliberal shift \rightarrow authoritarian, technocratic and antidemocratic
 - Resilience due to strength of dominant class, legal lock-in and retrenched democracy
- Dysfunctional financial architecture and macro imbalances: debt- and export-led growth
 - Resilience due to unfavourable income distribution, persistence of growth models and fragmented opposition
- Paradoxical situation: bias towards finance prevents more even income distribution while it is responsible for continuous fragile and crisis-ridden regime
- → Weak resilience in the sense that the policy regime became more rigid, but also more contradictory and fragile

6. Shortcomings and further research ideas

- Apply more narrow definition of neoliberalism: danger of allencompassing concept
- Add temporal dimension to analysis: phases of executive and rulebased shift?
- Contradictory relationship between rule-based and executive policy: analyse precise relationship in more detail
- Differentiate dominant class (financial / industrial capital etc.): investigate into static and dynamic interests; strategy that looks irrational in the SR (continuing crisis) could be rational in the long run?

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